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Abstract: In previous work, we have argued that there are considerable areas of overlap 
between anarchism and complexity thinking, in particular because both explore the 
possibilities for the development of order without a specific source of authority. In more 
recent interventions we have developed a posthuman world view as a political project based 
on a foundation in complexity thinking. Hierarchical and exclusive forms of social 
organisation are usually understood by anarchists to be forms of domination. It is 
unsurprising then, that the history of anarchist thought and practical political engagement 
demonstrates a concern with an eclectic range of dominations. In this paper, we argue that in 
questioning our treatment of the environment, or ‘nature’ and in problematising some of our 
relations with non-human beings and things, some anarchism usefully informs the politics of 
posthumanism. 
We trace the past and contemporary linkages between anarchism and posthumanist 
thinking, drawing on literature in the overlapping fields of political ecologism, new 
materialism and animal studies. However, we also argue that there is a contradiction 
embedded in arguments for the liberation of human and non-human beings and things and a 
recognition that our world was ever more-than-human. The western conception of the human 
as an autonomous, rational being able to make decisions and choices about actions has only 
developed alongside, and in contradistinction to, the ‘animal’. These conceptions of 
autonomy and rationality have been important to all western left political projects, including 
much of the politics of ecologism and anarchism, where the notion of ‘freedom’ is writ large. 
If anarchism is to have a posthuman future, we consider that it needs to interrogate and 
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perhaps loosen its ties to some established conceptual building blocks of the western political 
tradition. 
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In previous work, we have brought together insights from complexity and anarchist thinking 
to develop an alternative, posthuman, conceptualisation of international relations (Cudworth 
and Hobden, 2010). We have argued that there are considerable areas of overlap between 
anarchism and complexity thinking, in particular, because both explore the possibilities for 
the development of order without a specific source of authority. Both pose similar questions 
about social organisation. We have contended that both anarchist theory and anarchist politics 
- opposed as they are, to a range of dominations that they see as interlinked and 
interdependent - are compatible with complex systems analysis. Our more recent work has 
built on a foundation in complexity thinking to develop posthumanism as a political, 
emancipatory project (Cudworth and Hobden, 2015a; 2018).  
In a similar way to other critical approaches, most notably Marxism(s) and feminisms, 
anarchists understand the world as constituted by social hierarchy and institutionalised 
oppression and domination. Hierarchical and exclusive forms of social organisation are 
usually understood by anarchists to be forms of domination. It is unsurprising then, that the 
history of anarchist thought and practical political engagement demonstrates a concern with 
an eclectic range of dominations; or what we might call intersectionality (Nocella et al, 
2015:10). Complexity thinking, we have argued provides an effective way of theorising such 
intersectionalised forms of exclusion (Cudworth and Hobden, 2011). Multiple forms of social 
domination have been at least as significant in anarchism as the focus on the state and 
governance; for some scholars and activists, more so. This concern with challenging multiple 
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sites of power has led to anarchism to be presented implicitly as a challenge to dominatory 
power. The coupling of anarchism with other explicit challenges (anarcha-feminism, anarcho-
communism, green anarchism, queer anarchism and so on) illustrates the eclecticism of the 
anarchist challenge. Here, we want to suggest that in questioning our treatment of the 
environment, or ‘nature’ and in problematising our relations with non-human beings and 
things, a range of anarchist perspectives usefully inform the politics of posthumanism. 
The aim of this article is to develop further our earlier ideas on posthuman political 
theory (Cudworth and Hobden, 2011; 2013a; 2013b) and focus specifically on the notion of 
emancipation or ‘liberation’ in the context of the attachments identified by a posthumanist 
political perspective (Cudworth and Hobden, 2015a). We trace the past and contemporary 
linkages between anarchism and posthumanist thinking, drawing on literature in the 
overlapping fields of political ecologism, new materialism and animal studies. However, we 
argue that there is a contradiction embedded in arguments for the liberation of human and 
non-human beings and things and a recognition that our world was ever more-than-human. 
The western conception of the human as an autonomous, rational being able to make 
decisions and choices about actions has only developed alongside, and in contradistinction to, 
the ‘animal’ (Cudworth and Hobden, 2014). Central to the enlightenment project was the 
view that nature was other to the human, something to be understood scientifically for the 
purposes of control and exploitation (Plumwood, 1993). These conceptions of autonomy and 
rationality have been important to all western left political projects, including anarchism. If 
anarchism is to have a posthuman future, we consider that it needs to interrogate and perhaps 
loosen its ties to some established conceptual building blocks of the western political 
tradition. 
The article begins by outlining different perspectives on the contested notion of 
posthumanism and delineating our own use of the term, linked to a complexity framework. 
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We then consider the ways in which the anarchist tradition might reflect elements of a 
posthumanist perspective, assessing the classical tradition of Peter Kropotkin and Élisée 
Reclus, followed by the more contemporary perspectives of Murray Bookchin, Bob Torres 
and Brian Dominick. There are certainly influential anarchist posthuman futures clearly 
outlined within anarcho-primitivism. We will discuss and critique the work of John Zerzan 
and David Watson whose ideas echo some of the ‘after-the-human’ futures associated with 
the eclectic field of posthumanist thinking. Our own ideas for a posthuman anarchism, 
however, do not take us ‘back-to-the-future’, rather, they draw on a range of perspectives 
which suggest possibilities for posthumanist emancipation that do not envisage an 
apocalyptic future of population reduction and life lived off the grid and in the woods. 
 
What Is Posthumanism? 
Posthumanism is a term which is currently making a significant impact across the social 
sciences. However, it has been used in a variety of way (Wolfe 2010: xi) – some of which 
contradict the way in which we deploy the term. We have previously suggested that 
posthumanism has been used in three principle ways: in the sense of a world after humanity, 
as forms of body modification and transhumanism, and, our own usage, a world comprised of 
the more than human. Hence we do not use the term to signify a world after humanity (see 
Cairns 2005; Zalasiewicz 2008). While we would acknowledge that current human practices 
have the potential to bring this about, our concerns are with a world in which humans are 
very much present. Nor do we employ the term in the in the sense of transhumanism – the 
implications that various forms of body modification have in questioning the boundaries 
between the human and non-human (Haraway 1985; Hables Gray 2001; Savulescu and 
Bostrom 2009). We regard this work as a form of hyper-humanism rather than as a concern 
with the ‘more than human’.  
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  By contrast, our posthumanism develops from complexity thinking in the social 
sciences. Such an analysis argues that complexity is a feature that can be observed across a 
range of both animate and inanimate systems. Complex thinking is not a normative approach 
in itself; it has been applied across a range of social science disciplines and has been 
particularly influential, for example, in Business Studies. However, it can also be used to 
highlight the hierarchies of power and forms of exclusion both within human systems (Walby 
2009) and between human and non-human systems (Cudworth, 2005). What is particularly 
significant for a posthumanist analysis is that complexity thinking highlights the 
interconnected character of systems, and provides us with a way of highlighting how human 
systems are totally immersed within a range of human and non-human systems (both animate 
and inanimate). Within a complexity framework, human activity cannot be separated from 
interactions with the rest of nature and such a framework usefully enables the political and 
intellectual aim of posthumanism -- that of challenging a human/nature divide. Crucially we 
regard posthumanism as a challenge to the humanist notion of human beings as somehow 
unique or exceptional. By contrast, the human species is not just ‘in’ nature but is rather ‘of’ 
nature. 
We have argued for a posthumanism that is concerned with a world made up of the 
more than human. This is not to deny the social world, but to argue that it is embedded in and 
dependent on non-human systems. An emancipatory posthumanism finds its inspiration in 
both a reduction of oppression within and across species barriers and in developing a more 
sustainable relationship with the rest of nature. In short, posthumanism provides a critique of 
the notion of human exceptionalism – summarised by Donna Haraway (2008: 11) as ‘the 
premise that humanity alone is not a spatial and temporal web of interspecies dependencies’. 
The central contribution of posthumanist thinking is to encourage a view of the world which 
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sees the human species within such a web of co-dependencies on both animate and inanimate 
systems.  
Recent analysis of climate change would suggest that that web of inter-dependencies 
is becoming severely disrupted, with potentially disastrous consequences for the human 
species. What also needs to be remembered is that climate change is already proving 
disastrous for a number of other species (Kolbert 2015) and other systems. In this context, it 
is unremarkable that anarchism, with a history of championing the significance of mutualism, 
might have something to say about the precarity of our current condition and the role of 
systems of domination in contributing to this. 
 
Posthuman Influences In The Anarchist Tradition 
As Richard White and Colin Williams note, ‘anarchist thought has mobilised not only around 
opposition to the state and capitalism, but in opposition to all forms of external authority and 
thus all forms of domination’ (2012: 1629). Hierarchical and exclusive forms of social 
organisation are usually understood by anarchists to be forms of domination, and anarchism 
has been preoccupied with a range of dominations – around race, ethnicity and nation; caste, 
class and wealth; formations of sex, sexuality and gender; colonialism, imperialism and 
warfare. Analyses of domination have also been used to understand our relationships to other 
species and to the planet, but rarely in explicitly anarchist ways. In this part of the article, we 
examine anarchism’s ‘posthuman past’ – legacies of more-than-human thinking within the 
anarchist tradition, and its ‘posthuman present’- more contemporary work connecting 
anarchism to the domination of the non-human world, particularly non-human animals. 
 
Anarchism’s posthuman past 
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The body of work left by key anarchist figures such as the geographers Kropotkin (1842-
1921) and Reclus (1830-1905) continue to enjoy well-deserved recognition and influence in 
anarchist work and critical thinking more broadly in terms of their critiques of the market and 
the state. Less attention, however, has been paid toward their writings which re-position 
humans as being a part of, rather than apart from, nature; and both observe commonalities 
between human and animal communities.  
 In his most celebrated work, Mutual Aid, Kropotkin (1998 [1902]) noted how few 
animal species exist by directly competing with each other compared to the numbers who 
practice ‘mutual aid’, and suggested that those who do are likely to experience the best 
evolutionary prospects. Kropotkin argued that the metaphor of the survival of the fittest had 
become the central way in which evolutionary theory had been explained. The focus on 
competition over-stated one aspect of evolution, ignoring the significance of co-operation 
within species; rather, ‘sociability is as much a law of nature as mutual struggle’ (Kropotkin 
1998 [1902]: 24). Starting with an examination of non-human animals Kropotkin claimed 
that ‘natural selection continually seeks out the ways precisely for avoiding competition as 
much as possible’ (1998 [1902]: 72). Given this, it is, therefore, unlikely that humans should 
have flourished so successfully without co-operation (1998 [1902]: 74). Mutual aid has been, 
Kropotkin argues, a feature of human existence that has widened its reach, ultimately 
potentially to the whole human species and beyond its boundaries (1998 [1902]: 234).  
The story of evolution in Kropotkin is not one of a path towards fixed things, but a process of 
relationships and linked becoming. Species is not a fixed taxonomy but about the recognition 
of what Darwin calls ‘differentiations’. Mutual Aid stressed the process of evolution as one 
where successful adaptation and exploitation of evolutionary niches is secured by species’ 
propensity for co-operation and solidarity. This order can be spontaneous and progressive. 
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Mutual aid is an organising force across a range of species, as a ‘factor of evolution’ that 
enables species, including humans, to flourish.  
 While Kropotkin’s key insight is the notion of humans as embedded in relationships 
with other species, and as animals amongst many others, Reclus provides a more explicit 
challenge in terms of the need to confront ‘the animal question’ as intrinsic to anarchist 
projects. In this and in countless other ways, Reclus clashed directly with the conservative 
and deeply speciesist moral codes of the society in which he lived (Clark and Martin 2004: 
33).  
 What is particularly interesting is the way in which Reclus encourages personal, 
subjective, and emotional (empathetic) connections to be made by his reader. In On 
Vegetarianism, for example, Reclus suggests the exploitation of nonhuman animals by 
appealing first to his reader’s emotional registers, rather than developing an argument based 
on enlightenment humanism (such as rights-based theory). The central argument is founded 
on personal and intimate reflections, which strike the heart of the reader far more intensely 
than appealing to the more abstract, mass killing of nonhuman animals. Reclus (1901: 1) 
offers this reflection: 
 
Other pictures cast their shadows over my childish years, and … mark so many 
epochs in my life. I can see the sow belonging to some peasants, amateur 
butchers, and therefore all the more cruel. I remember one of them bleeding the 
animal slowly, so that the blood fell drop by drop; for, in order to make really 
good black puddings, it appears essential that the victim should have suffered 
proportionately. She cried without ceasing, now and then uttering groans and 
sounds of despair almost human; it seemed like listening to a child. And in fact 
the domesticated pig is for a year or so a child of the house; pampered that he 
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may grow fat, and returning a sincere affection for all the care lavished on him, 
which has but one aim—so many inches of bacon. But when the affection is 
reciprocated by the good woman who takes care of the pig, fondling him and 
speaking in terms of endearment to him, is she not considered ridiculous — as if 
it were absurd, even degrading, to love an animal that loves us?  
 
Reclus's approach is to personalise encounters with non-human animals in such a way that 
encourages the reader to empathise closely with the memory, while also (hopefully) 
reflecting meaningfully on their individual experiences of similar examples of horrors. 
Undoubtedly, Reclus's distressing childhood experiences and encounters of violent 
human/nonhuman animal encounters encourage the reader to see the violence against other 
creatures embedded in our daily lives and practices (see White, 2015). In ‘On 
Vegetarianism’, Reclus entreats us towards a future in which we and our surroundings 
‘become beautiful’ in a world without animal abuse.  
While Kropotkin’s entreaties for the acknowledgement of mutualism and the 
embedding of all creatures in ‘federations’ of life is one based on apparently dispassionate 
observation, Reclus draws on personal experience to engage an empathetic response from the 
reader. Such an understanding of our close relations with some other species and the 
entangled lives we live is, as we will later see, a feature of current feminist work on which 
anarchist posthumanism might usefully draw. Importantly, these notions of entanglement and 
shared empathy - of the kind demonstrated in Reclus and often marginalised in political 
thought - suggest the importance of attachments-with-others and raise questions for the 
political subject of liberal humanism that undergirds notions of ‘freedom’ and of ‘liberation’. 
 
Anarchism’s posthuman present 
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Many of Kropotkin’s ideas are elaborated in the work of Murray Bookchin, who has been 
instrumental in linking anarchism to green social and political thought in the development of 
‘social ecology’. The notion of overlapping and intersected forms of social domination which 
are systemic and co-constituting is clearly compatible with an intersectionalised analysis of 
social domination. In addition, Bookchin’s understanding of the hybridised and amorphous 
nature of contemporary political systems embedded firmly in the social fabric and constantly 
in the processes of arranging and rearranging social life – can be given a posthumanist 
reading (in particular Bookchin 2005: 191-200). However, although Bookchin is to be 
applauded for his conception of humans as in and of nature, he holds to a problematic human 
exclusivity when it comes to considering relations between human and other species.  
A mechanism by which he does this is the distinction between ‘first’ and ‘second’ 
nature. For Bookchin, humans as a species have developed to an exceptional degree such that 
they have produced a ‘second nature’, that is, a ‘uniquely human culture, a wide variety of 
institutionalised human communities, an effective human technics, a richly symbolic 
language, and a carefully managed source of nutriment’ (Bookchin 1990: 162). An important 
distinction between human and non-human nature is hierarchy, ‘institutionalized and highly 
ideological systems of command and obedience’, which are an ‘exclusive characteristic of 
second nature’ (Bookchin 2005: 26). Over time, Bookchin suggests that hierarchic relations 
emerged related primarily to gender, age and lineage, developing into the range of hierarchic 
distinctions that typify the contemporary world. Our current malaise is a result of an 
evolutionary history containing two competing logics – that of spontaneous mutualistic 
ecological differentiation, and that of social domination (Light 1998: 7). As with Kropotkin, 
Bookchin considers that species exist in relations of mutual interdependence and co-operation 
and the concept of species co-evolution and ‘federations’ of life forms, runs through both 
Mutual Aid and The Ecology of Freedom.  
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However, Bookchin’s narrative sits within the enlightenment paradigm where the 
human subject has pre-eminence. Despite Bookchin’s concern for the human treatment of the 
non-human, The Ecology of Freedom tells the story of a human evolution to a higher level of 
consciousness culminating in a state of ‘free nature’ in which intra-human hierarchies are 
dissolved and the domination of the environment is no more. It is inferred by this that animals 
will be liberated through our enlightened protectionism, which enables other species to 
flourish. However, the human domain remains unique and distinct (Bookchin 2005: 458). 
While we would concur with Bookchin that the human world has certain unique properties, 
the hard distinction of human worlds from those of all other species is an unnecessary and 
humanocentric move. Bookchin is careful to track the development of different forms of 
intra-human domination, their distinct qualities and co-constituted aspects. When it comes to 
the human domination of ‘first nature’ however, there is a reductionist argument made that 
the end of intra-human domination will simply result in the demise of the exploitation and 
oppression of non-human beings. In sum, Bookchin’s intervention effectively bolsters human 
exceptionalism. We humans are collectively, uplifted subjects, with exclusive agential 
powers to enact both our own liberations, and that of others. 
Despite this, Bookchin (and Kropotkin) provide us with a useful legacy. For example, 
the insight that many species have overlapping forms of ‘species life’ with humans, with 
certain needs, forms of sociality and ecological and cross-species dependency; the challenge 
in Kropotkin of the presumption of human separateness from ‘other’ animals, arguing that we 
should think about ‘differentiations’ rather than differences. Differentiations of species, and 
particular social, economic and ecological contexts give rise to different kinds of human 
animal relationship that sociological animal studies has been concerned with, such as the use 
of certain non-human animals as labourers of various kinds; as food and resources; as 
‘companions’; as human entertainment and so on. We might best understand these socially 
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constituted categorisations as carrying relations of human power, and that power is very often 
not benign.  
More recently, anarchist scholarship has specifically focused on the relationship 
between humans and other animals, and considers species difference as a form of social 
domination. Of particular note is the work of Bob Torres (2007), who applies David Nibert’s 
(2002) model of animal oppression to the case of highly industrialised capital-intensive 
agriculture in the global north, and in doing so, explicitly links it to anarchist politics. In 
addition, there is the important pamphlet by Brian Dominick (1995; 1996; 1997), Animal 
Liberation and Social Revolution, which outlined the similarities in perspective between 
anarchism and veganism, broadly defined in terms of living a life which is as compassionate 
as possible towards animals, including of course, human beings. 
Capitalism has, as Torres rightly suggests, ‘deepened, extended and worsened our 
domination over animals and the natural world’ (2007: 3). Whilst human and non-human 
animals are exploited under capitalism, the forms of exploitation differ. The bodies of non-
human animals are not only exploited by working for us in order to produce animal food 
products, their bodies are themselves commodities, as he puts it: ‘they are superexploited 
living commodities’ (2007: 58). Animal lives and bodies are a means of profit creation within 
capitalism. In addition, animals are property, and this relationship of ownership over animal 
bodies is essential for the extraction of profit. Animals-as-property means that, in the case of 
animal agriculture for example, animals are ‘sensate living machines’ for the production of 
commodities (2007: 64). For Torres, capitalism remains the key analytical device throughout, 
and his analysis of human relations with non-human domesticate animals is conceptually 
underpinned by notions of property relations and commoditisation.  
Torres sees a critique of domination and a contestationary politics of non-domination 
as key to anarchist politics (Torres 2007: 85-7). For Torres, the domination of the non-human 
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animal world is an instance of highly normalised and everyday oppression in which most 
western humans are much invested. It is also crucial to understand our relations with non-
human animals as integrated into intra-human exploitative and oppressive structures. The 
analyses of linked dominations and of the politics of non-domination could have played a 
greater role in Torres’ analysis however. While he allows that the histories of exploitative 
systems are different and differentiated (2007: 156), and that the oppression of animals can 
exist before and beyond capitalism, his analysis of the oppression of animals, however, is 
focused on one systemic cause: ‘If we’re to be successful in fighting oppression – whether 
based on race, class, species or gender identity - we’re going to need to fight the heart of the 
economic order that drives these oppressions. We’re going to have to fight capitalism’(Torres 
2007: 11). This is ultimately, a reductionist position and a more fully intersectionalised 
analysis requires the broader notion of multiple domination, such as is found in Bookchin.  
This broader perspective comes through strongly in the pamphlet by Brian Dominick 
which argues that contesting domination is key to vegan politics. However, in further 
reflecting on his earlier work, Dominick has some harsh criticism for Torres: Even in a book 
that levels a masterful argument against exploitation of animals, naming capitalism as a 
lynchpin of oppression, Torres remarkably makes no case for the real-world effectiveness of 
the veganism he advocates, practiced on an individual or even a mass scale. (2015: 32) In 
reflecting on the publication of Veganarchy more than twenty years ago, Dominick (2015: 
23) contextualises his intervention in terms of the need for: ‘a truly humble, empathic, 
animal-respecting stance [which]was conspicuously lacking in anarchism - even the “green” 
varieties, namely social ecology, anarcho-primitivism, and deep ecology. Despite the fact that 
these intellectual tendencies focus on the environment, they were fundamentally humanistic 
or mystic in orientation’.  
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In Veganarchy, Dominick calls for anarchists to recognise the imposition of social 
categories on animals. Non-human species are not ‘less’ than humans, rather, this hierarchy is 
constantly reproduced by the active dehumanisation of animals and the reinforcement of 
separation. This hierarchy is political, and anarchists sensitive to the naturalisation of 
categories of oppression (in terms of gender or race or ability and so on) should be attuned to 
those generated by the politics of species domination. In addition to an objection to hierarchy, 
anarchists are called to oppose the exploitation, violence and alienation experienced by non-
human animals as well as the alienation of many human labourers in such industries, and 
avoid as far as possible, the consumption of products based on the exploitation and suffering 
of animals. The intersectionalised nature of the domination of animals means that veganism 
becomes part of the multi-faceted resistance to the dominant social paradigm that is 
anarchism: ‘Only a perspective and lifestyle based on true compassion can destroy the 
oppressive constructs of present society…This to me is the essence of anarchy. No one who 
fails to embrace all struggles against oppression as his or her own fits my definition of an 
anarchist’ (Dominick 1997: 13). 
On reflection, in an afterword to the third version of Animal Liberation and Social 
Revolution, Dominick softens this line and suggests that whilst social revolution is needed in 
all spheres of domination, including our relations towards non-human animals, we must see 
compassionate living as a process rather than an end state. It is an ideal to which few if any of 
us will realise, but a struggle to be engaged with. Indeed, the struggles in countering multiple 
dominations and oppressions in daily life mean that our political choices are always 
compromised and complicated. Most recently, Dominick (2015) rejects what he sees as a 
fundamentalist culture that has, on many levels sought to appropriate the term veganarchy 
over the last twenty years. He critically addresses the limits of a militant or dogmatic 
interpretation and makes a persuasive case for development of a more nuanced understanding 
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of veganism and anarchism, one composed of constellations of values and principles – a more 
intersectionalised understanding, perhaps.  
Dominick’s plea is for veganism to be understood as part of a process of human 
liberation which enables us to ‘free’ animals from exploitation and oppression. What 
‘agency’ non-human animals might have is a topic of keen debate in animal studies. In the 
social sciences, agency has been attributed to beings with desires, intentions and wills and 
this definition certainly applies to some non-human species, certainly to those animals within 
agricultural complexes and many of those kept as pets in the west. Many species, particularly 
domesticates, have a sense of selfhood. They can exercise choice and communicate with 
humans and other species (however much the content may be open to interpretation) as 
fellow agentic beings. Yet what might constitute ‘liberation’ for other species we might never 
know. Indeed, our very language of ‘liberation’ is both humanist and human-centred. In his 
afterword Dominick wisely eschews the term ‘liberation’ for animals in favour of terms such 
as freedom from exploitation and violence, which he sees as essential to the anarchist project 
of freedom for all. It is here that anarchism might usefully revisit notions of freedom, 
autonomy and liberation – all key concepts with which anarchism has postulated our political 
futures - with a critical and posthumanist eye. 
 
Posthuman Futures 
In this second half of the article, we consider the possible political futures emerging from a 
politics which recognises both the more-than-human constitution of our world and that lived 
practices, social relations and the nature of being are altered by such multiple constitution. 
Some of these reconceptualisations of the human take the form of nature writing to rekindle 
the ‘wild within’. Others are more overtly political such as the primitivist position associated 
with Zerzan and others, which has overlaps with the politics of deep ecologism. A second 
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approach is to become more ‘creaturely’ by shrinking the imperial elements of the 
constitution of the human in order that we look at other species and scapes without a colonial 
gaze. Finally, there is the reconfiguration of the human through entangled politics. Our own 
posthuman and post-domination future draws on ecological feminist and other perspectives in 
suggesting an embodied politics of creaturely entanglement through which we might both 
reconfigure the human and become free. 
  
Back to the Future – anarcho primitivism and feral politics 
According to anarcho-primitivist authors like Zerzan (1998; 1999; 2004; 2008) and Watson 
(2003), complex social systems require continual sacrifice, people and other creatures may 
simply disappear. Yet in modern industrial societies the ‘sacrificed’ are hidden away, such 
that we do not see mass violence - like extinction – as violence. For Zerzan, industrial 
societies involve mass extermination of life – for example industrial systems build in 
acceptable losses of life - in terms of deaths from airbourne pollution, for example.  
Zerzan (2008) considers that humanity's fall from grace did not begin with 
industrialism or even with agriculture, but with the embrace of symbolic culture, i.e., 
language, art, and number. Culture, rather than being viewed as our great emancipator, is 
seen by Zerzan as a form of undesirable mediation which distances us from our capacity to 
realise ourselves within the moment. Zerzan argues that what he calls ‘original’ human 
societies in the Palaeolithic and similar societies today such as indigenous groups locations 
experiencing very minimal interaction with modernity live a non-alienated and non-
oppressive form of life based on primitive abundance and closeness to nature. Zerzan’s 
Future Primitive (1994) and its sister (2012) are an unequivocal assertion of the superiority of 
hunter-gatherer lifeways. Zerzan rejects the thesis that the cultural practices and technologies 
of modernity are neutral, rather, these developments are carefully constructed means of 
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enslaving people. Zerzan uses anthropological studies from ‘original’ and ‘primitive’ 
societies as the basis for a wide-ranging critique of aspects of modern life and to suggest 
these are a political ideal or model, for future development, or rather, de-development and de-
domestication.  
Like Zerzan, Watson wants us to reimagine what it means to be human by becoming 
de-domesticated, less civilised and connecting with our animal nature. In his best-known 
work, Against the Megamachine, Watson draws on the thinking of archaeologists such as 
Marshall Sahlins and Mircea Eliade and powerful critics of 'First World' society such as 
Lewis Mumford, Ivan Illich and Vandana Shiva to argue that contemporary notions of 
‘progress’ (defended by those such as Bookchin and Chomsky), must be abandoned to the 
nineteenth century in order to make anarchism fit for purpose in the twenty-first. Key to this 
critique and to that of Zerzan, is the idea that in industrial modernity, humans have lost 
species authenticity and no longer understand what it means to live well as a human animal. 
What is needed in this context is to reclaim our authenticity. While Zerzan has held fast to 
this opinion, Watson (1997) has come to argue that a ‘reasoned primitivism’ is necessary. 
This is focused on critiques of social domination and strategies for social change rather than 
the individualised becoming of de-domesticated human animals ‘re-wilding’ themselves. 
This difference in position is obliterated in Murray Bookchin’s (1995) anarchist 
critique of the anti-civilisational and anti-technological perspective. He argued that Zerzan's 
representation of hunter-gatherers was flawed, selective and often patronisingly racist, that 
his analysis was superficial, and that his practical proposals were nonsensical. Ultimately, 
civilisation is to be defended, for  
 
To malign civilization without due recognition of its enormous potentialities for 
self-conscious freedom -- a freedom conferred by reason as well as emotion, by 
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insight as well as desire, by prose as well as poetry -- is to retreat back into the 
shadowy world of brutishness, when thought was dim and intellectuation was 
only an evolutionary promise (Bookchin 1995: 56). 
 
The critique of western civilisation is potent, however, and has been influential in 
contemporary anarchist developments at the intersection of anarchism, political ecologism 
and animal liberation, both theoretically and practically. In a recent essay, Mara Pfeffer and 
Sean Parson (2015: 126) argue that enormous numbers of human animals are killed, 
mutilated, poisoned or abused by industrial capitalist systems, alongside countless billions of 
non-human animals. Thus: 
 
… there can be no total liberation: no end to colonization, genocide, or animal 
exploitation, without addressing the root problem of our era - industrial 
civilization. We argue that animal liberationists, anarchists, and all people 
concerned with exploitation and suffering need to reject the dreams of techno-
utopias, worker-run industrial factories, and post-scarcity eco-communism. If we 
wish to live and see life flourish on this planet, there is only one alternative: we 
must envision a politics centered around burning down the factories, dismantling 
the energy grid, and liberating all animals, human and nonhuman. 
 
‘Total liberation’ (Best 2011a; Best 2011b; Colling, Parson and Arrigoni, 2013) considers 
that human liberation requires animal and earth liberation as well. Further, for Steven Best, 
‘liberation’ in the form of one manifestation of oppression/domination, such as ‘race’ for 
example, may not be secured in isolation from other varieties which co-constitute them. Thus 
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humans cannot be ‘free’ while continuing to exploit the labour and bodies of non-human 
animals. Total liberation, because of this, requires a move away from the ideas of ‘progress’ 
which have been bound up with colonial and capitalist forms of development. For Pfeffer and 
Parson (2015: 136-7) however, to apply primitivist politics with ‘total liberation’ means that 
primitivism needs to be far more critical in its analysis and deployment of the notion of 
‘animality’: ‘It is not good enough to call for a politics of “rewilding,” where humans 
reconnect to their “natural” animality because colonialism, classism, racism, and sexism have 
worked in tandem to construct what the term means.’ The primitivism they advocate is a 
‘feral politics’ of compassion and solidarity where the goal is to dismantle the social and 
economic systems that are killing this planet. In addition, we need a politics to create real and 
lasting communities, not only between humans but also between humans and the more-than-
human world.  
This is understood however, as a politics of liberation. Recent publications in Critical 
Animal Studies (for example, Nocella et al 2014) contain a range of interesting contributions 
all of which skirt round the question of what it might mean from a green, anarchist and 
critical animal perspective to speak of freedom. Some suggest a politics of ‘groundless 
solidarity’ in which, we must … struggle to help non-humans create spaces where they can 
flourish and develop their own organic relations and communities (Colling, Parson and 
Arrigoni 2014: 68).  
Colling et al go on to explain that this means fighting against institutions that 
imprison, abuse and kill non-human animals (like those of farming and experimentation), 
supporting those animals who ‘resist their human oppressors’ (such, perhaps, as those 
escaping from farms or slaughterhouses), and stopping the geographic marginalisation of 
wild animals. But this is not ‘liberation’ in the conventional sense as deployed in western 
political theory. Supporting farmed animals through the sanctuary movement is a 
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demonstration of care and respect for animal-being, rather than an act of liberation in which 
non-human animals are set free. Feminist scholars in particular might agree, sceptical as 
many are of projects for ‘liberation’ cast in the mould of enlightenment humanism (Braidotti 
2013). The notions of ‘emancipation’ and ‘liberation’ are drawn around the liberal subject of 
enlightenment humanism who seeks autonomy. Even the feral politics, the becoming animal 
of anarcho-primitivism, is caught in the humanist trap, for as individuals becoming more 
authentically human, we realise our freedom in autonomous lives without the trappings of 
domesticity.  
We have recently (Cudworth and Hobden, 2015a) argued for a critical posthumanism 
that is for all that lives, and for the purpose of eliminating multiple forms of oppression. 
Whilst this chimes with advocacy of ‘total liberation’ (Best 2010), it is not entirely clear what 
advocacy of eliminating oppression or securing various liberations might entail as we 
challenge the ‘intricate interrelationship’ of ‘hierarchical power systems’ within which 
humanity and the natural world are exploited (Best 2007: 3). Some feminist work has allied 
itself strongly with a politics of animal rights and a stance of ‘total liberation’ (jones 2004). 
But within feminist animal studies there tends to be more tolerance of a diversity of 
perspectives and engagements (see Gaard 2012). In part, this is because there has been a 
concerted attempt to disturb the human/animal binary through a critique of liberal humanism 
and the articulation of different kinds of positions on embodiment and materiality. This is a 
very different trajectory from that of animal rights theory or much political ecologism which 
has tended to try and empty moral theory of its humancentric biases whilst still holding fast to 
anthropocentric humanisms moral and methodological commitments to reason (Diamond 
2008). Feminism has been far more attentive to the ways anthropocentric humanism, 
ironically, influences debate on what emancipation for humans, other animals and ‘nature’ 
might mean.  
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In developing a politics which contests oppression, it is important to remember that 
the concepts of liberation, emancipation and rights draw very heavily on the same European 
enlightenment humanism which informed a model of political and cultural universalism that 
has had disastrous consequences for many peoples and non-human lifeworlds. While much 
has been written to effectively critique the liberal humanist underpinnings of colonialist and 
imperialist endeavours in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, liberal humanism persists 
still in the language of animal rights, just as it undergirds notions of human rights. But does a 
problematising of the liberal and enlightenment foundations of emancipatory agendas mean 
that they cannot be disentangled from the imperialist missions and human-centred 
humanism? This needs to be carefully negotiated. As emancipatory politics has learned to its 
cost, conceptions of liberty, rights, wellbeing and so on are fraught with contradiction, and 
this is why an emphasis on the intersectional qualities of domination is so important. What 
unites various forms of critical scholarship is an understanding of ‘humanity’ as embedded in 
networks of relations of dependency with the non-human lifeworld, and seeing the fragility of 
embodied life, both human and non-human. Living in the woods as a more authentic animal 
does not foreground our embedding, but is individual and an esoteric journey back to an 
‘authentic self’ which never was. 
What other sources might we draw upon then, in leaving the imperial human behind? 
There are many sources of inspiration for posthuman futures and we draw on two feminist 
accounts here – Spinozist ‘renaturalisation’ of a rather different kind with Hasana Sharp’s 
‘philanthropic posthumanism’, and the ecofeminist ethics of Lori Gruen and her conception 
of ‘entangled empathy’. The form of embodiment recommended by Zerzan, as we have seen, 
embraces the sensate in understanding our animal selves. A rather different approach to 
embodying the human is to consider the human as sharing embodied vulnerability and 
exposure and to recommend a politics of engaging with others, rather than one of becoming. 
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In such engagement we might reconstitute our ideas of the human without resorting to a 
crude notion of de-domestication that denies our co-evolved histories and lifeways with other 
species, domesticate and not.  
 
Philanthropic Posthumanism 
Drawing inspiration from the work of Benedictus de Spinoza, Hasana Sharp (2011) advocates 
a ‘philanthropic posthumanism’. Spinoza’s ‘system’ provides a productive basis for a 
posthuman analysis, because for Spinoza all that exists is essentially of one substance and 
indivisible. Humans as a species do not stand in a ‘supernatural’ position to the rest of nature, 
yet nor should we view ourselves as ‘subnatural’ – we are simply part of nature. As Sharp 
(2011: 5) explains, Spinoza’s philosophy aims to undermine those perspectives that see the 
human as either ‘defective gods or … corrupt animals who need to be restored to our natural 
condition’. 
What, then, for Sharp is the character of ‘philanthropic posthumanism’, and towards 
what or who is the philanthropy directed? Sharp argues for a renaturalisation of human 
relations with the rest of nature. By this she means ‘a new appreciation of ourselves as parts 
of nature, operating to the same rules as anything else, invariably dependent upon infinitely 
many other beings, human and nonhuman’ (Sharp 2011: 5). Drawing in particular on the 
work of Elizabeth Grosz, Sharp views a renaturalisation as part of a political project that not 
only concerns inter-human relations but also relations across the species barrier. However, 
she is also keen to maintain Spinoza’s view that the rest of nature does not provide a model 
for humans to aspire to as Zerzan attests. Rather her aim is to navigate ‘between 
supernaturalism and subnaturalism’ (Sharp 2011: 6). 
From the perspective of contemporary concerns about rights for non-human animals 
some of Spinoza’s comments are, in the least, regrettable. For example, Spinoza (cited in 
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Sharp 2011: 109) argues that ‘a law against killing animals is based more on empty 
superstition and womanish compassion than sound reason’, furthermore ‘our advantage 
teaches us to establish a bond with men, but not with beasts’. We also need to acknowledge 
Spinoza’s misogyny. Yet Sharp argues that comments such as these need to be considered 
within context. Spinoza makes no claims about human exceptionalism, nor does he see 
characteristics as being unique to humans. Spinoza’s concern, in terms of our considerations 
of other animals, is that these not become the measure of human morality or a guide for 
judging human activity. As Sharp (2011: 189) states ‘Spinoza’s concern with beasts is almost 
entirely unrelated to the codification, legal or moral, of human behaviour toward nonhuman 
animals’. Rather his concern is with the possibility of ‘the eruption of an anticivilization 
ethos that treats beasts as exemplars for human to imitate and to admire’. This relates to the 
view of humans as subnatural, which for Spinoza is both unethical and makes no sense within 
the understanding of his system. An example would be those within the ecological movement 
who see humans in a particularly negative light with regard to their relations with the rest of 
nature or who, like Zerzan and Watson, see as inauthentic animals corrupted by civilization – 
for Spinoza this would be another form of humanism. Rather we should accept our position 
within nature, a renaturalisation.  
In avoiding both supernaturalism (the liberal humanist position) and subnaturalist 
(those who would take nonhuman nature as the model for human activity), Sharp argues for 
philanthropic posthumanism. Such an understanding of Spinoza emphasises the potential for 
positive interactions between actors. Sharp, following Deleuze, argues for a broadening from 
Spinoza’s emphasis on inter-human relations to a consideration of the possibilities of positive 
interactions across the species divide. This is described as ‘ethological ethics’. 
 For Sharp, there are no grounds within Spinoza’s system for drawing a boundary in 
terms of interactions between species. Indeed, Spinoza’s system emphasises, as seen above, 
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that human activity cannot be seen as distinct, or independent of the rest of nature. Yet while 
the move to consider the possibilities of ‘enabling encounters’ across species boundaries, we 
need to remain aware of Spinoza’s cautionary remarks. Sharp (2011: 217) notes that ‘a turn to 
the animal, to be liberating, must not be an expression of melancholy or felt powerlessness. 
Antipathy and misanthropy will, according to Spinoza, infect any political program with sad 
passions that will ultimately hamstring any efforts at liberation’.  
 As Sharp acknowledges, the context in which we might consider interactions between 
identities has changed. Spinoza’s concern was to overcome divisions within the human 
fraternity brought about through religious schisms – something he encountered at first hand. 
This perhaps explains his focus on the human. For Sharp, in changed circumstance, and with 
changed knowledge, ‘we may need a new universal’. Posthumanists have pointed to our 
constitution not only by fellow humans but also by a range of animate and inanimate entities 
from robots to bacteria to companion species. Sharp (2011: 218) observes that in denying 
these co-constituting entities ‘we mutilate ourselves and the sources of power in our midst.’ 
A ‘philanthropic posthumanism’ seeks thus to pursue the benefits to all from positive 
interactions, ‘not governed by the image of man, or even the human’ (Sharp 2011: 219). 
However, for Sharp, to avoid these interactions becoming affected by negative thoughts the 
human species needs to accept its place in nature. While this may be an embedded position, it 
cannot account for the very concrete difficulties which all kinds of radical political ecologism 
– anarchist, socialist, feminist, primitivist and coalitions thereof -  have pointed out. Here, the 
human is a flattened category – there are men, and sadly, for Spinoza, there are women, but 
the other differences which fracture the human are absent for both Spinoza and for Sharp. 
May an entangled ethics be better placed to take account of the co-constitution of our world 
and the tensions and differences this involves? While we consider this first below, a further 
issue with which this article closes is that of the context in which humans (for Spinoza) or all 
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beings (for Sharp) might flourish. As Chris Cuomo (1998) argued some time ago, ecofeminist 
ethics might be based around conceptions of enabling entangled life to flourish, but this 
should be framed in the political and social context of community. 
 
Entangled Empathy  
For Lori Gruen, our relationships with non-human nature should be based on an entangled 
empathy. Traditionally in extending our thoughts about ethical behaviour towards non-human 
animals has been based on questions of ‘likeness’. So that in the same way that rights have 
been gradually extended within the human community –rights can be extended to non-human 
species on the basis of their similarities to us. This has resulted, for example, in arguments 
that rights should be extended to other great apes, based on our very close evolutionary 
development (for example, the case of Sarah an orang-utan who was granted legal 
personhood in an Argentinian court). Likewise, arguments have been made regarding 
personhood for dolphins given their intelligence and rich social lives. 
This approach, derived in particular from the work of Peter Singer (1975) is described 
as ‘widening the circle’ – in other words attempting to extend the moral boundary to those 
closest to the human. The problem, from a posthuman perspective, is that this is a thoroughly 
humanist position, in that it maintains the human as the yardstick by which other species are 
judged – those that are closest to the human ideal will be the first to be included within the 
ethical community. 
 Lori Gruen instead argues that we should begin a notion of empathy. While 
acknowledging that the practice of widening the circle has helped in considering and 
highlighting the plight of those nonhuman species closest to us, it has not had significant 
practical results. In widening the circle there will always be an excluded other. An alternate 
position would be to accept that our lives are ‘entangled’ with the rest of nature, and to 
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consider the ethical consequences that emerge from this situation. As Gruen (2013: 224) 
‘indicates, when we acknowledge this we can begin to reflect on the nature of those 
relationships in an effort to be responsible to those with whom we are engaged’. In reflecting 
on those relationships it is not simply an issue of projecting our own impressions onto the 
other’s perspective, but ‘working to try to grasp the perspective of the other’ (Gruen 2013: 
225). For Gruen, such understanding across the species boundary requires us to learn about 
the behaviours of other species and maintaining an awareness of the co-constituted character 
of our relationships with other species (Gruen 2013: 226). 
While there are clearly difficulties involved in empathising and particularly across 
species boundaries, Gruen’s point is that it not only is possible to empathise with non-human 
animals, we have an ethical duty to those with whom we are entangled. For Haraway (2008), 
important in realising the potentials of human-animal relationship is direct embodied 
experience where we ‘meet’ and share across the species barrier, co-constituting one another. 
While this position has similarities to the cross-species relations of entangled empathy, there 
is an important additional point to note in Haraway’s account – social context. We encounter 
other species and are entangled with them in specific spaces and places, in social institutions 
and practices. As Haraway (2008:5) puts it, we are ‘beings-in-encounter in the house, lab, 
field, zoo, park, office, prison, ocean, stadium, barn or factory’. Both Sharp and Gruen have a 
tendency to detach the relations between humans and the ‘others’ of nature from their social 
context and the relations associated with these. A renaturalised ethics of flourishing and an 
entangled empathy needs, in our view, to be a situated ethics – one of posthuman community. 
 
Posthuman community 
The imperative of posthumanism, in our view, is to develop tools for promoting an 
understanding of human embeddedness in non-human animate and inanimate systems. In 
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addition, a critical posthumanism is required. For example, in our recent work on the more-
than-human nature of warfare (Cudworth and Hobden, 2015b) we argue that exclusively-
human warfare would look very different but for the drawing of an enormous variety of non-
human creatures (from bees to elephants to orcas) into the practices of warfare means that the 
constitution of war is qualitatively altered. Posthumanism urges us to attend to the realities of 
our situation in a world where we are all made up of multiple species and things. A 
posthuman account not only includes animals, it draws our attention to the co-constitutive 
character of human/non-human systems. Erika Cudworth’s (2011a, 2011b, 2017) work on 
companion animals in human households and public places argues that the spaces of dog 
walking are those of beings-in-encounter which can be seen as posthuman micro-
communities (of dogs and human companions) which emerge over time through routine 
practices and have particular characteristics. Cudworth’s research, in East London, and rural 
Leicestershire demonstrates the emergence of communities made up of people and dogs from 
a large variety of backgrounds and socio-economic locations. Posthuman communities are 
also distinctly located. The practice of walking through a particular space leads dog walkers 
to a knowledge of the places through which they walk and to the development of practices of 
care for those spaces and the creatures they encounter there - including other humans and 
other dogs. Non-human animals are also productive in the generation of relationships. There 
are ‘cross-pack’ relations in terms of intra-species and trans-species companionship and 
conviviality. Communities of dogs and human walkers are thus posthuman in two ways: in 
being made up of relationships between dogs and human guardians, and in terms of the ways 
such relations change the ways in which both humans and dogs engage with other beings. 
This has implications for how sociologists (and others) understand the notion of community 
and suggests the possibility of a diversity of beings in various spatially located communities.  
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In a similar way spaces of war are also spaces of beings-in-encounter through which 
particular communities emerge. They are very different spaces – often of tension, of threat 
and danger, though also ones in which humans and dogs, camels, horses and so on may ‘hang 
out’ together. Humans and animals may be cast together suddenly as unlikely co-actors in the 
theatre of war and the rather different communities that emerge are likely to have specific 
characteristics. These are issues we would wish to further explore through case studies of 
particular conflicts, and the interrelations with specific species. It is also the case that in the 
entangled relations and spaces of warfare empathetic relations emerge. 
 An ethics of entangled empathy and philanthropic posthumanism, emergent in 
contexts of posthuman community problematises institutionalised mass killing of humans and 
non-humans, and the destruction of the living world more widely in practices both overtly 
political (such as the practice of war) and social (such as the ruination of waterways on which 
multispecies communities depend, or the operation of the global industrial-food system). A 
posthuman politics raises questions for the liberal humanist subject and the struggle for 
rights, for freedoms and for ‘liberation’. We are in this world together, and might never be 
truly detached, despite all the struggles of Empire in its many guises. Yet we might resist 




In advocating a critical politics of posthumanism, we stress the importance of an analysis 
which stresses the common constitution of all living things. A systems analysis derived from 
complexity theory allows for the analysis of the interactions between human and non-human 
systems and between animate and in-animate systems. This forms the basis of an ethic of care 
and responsibility, of entangled empathy, which does not cease at the species border. 
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We have suggested that despite a legacy and a presence of ecological politics and 
critical animal studies scholarship, anarchism, like many critical political traditions, often 
remains wedded to human-centred and human-defined concepts of the political. Feminist 
approaches such as those described here have been an important counter to this. In both 
feminist animal studies and ecofeminism a politics and ethics of embodied vulnerability and 
entangled existence leads us away from the political agendas of rights for non-humans. Does 
this really get us away from the human? In sum, despite an acknowledgement of 
embodiment, of attachment in relational and often deeply material webs, such analytics is a 
construction of our world through human discourse. As Erica Fudge (2003) repeatedly 
emphasises in her discussion of ‘animal’, we humans simply cannot ‘get away from 
ourselves’ so that all talk of relationality, embeddedness and so on is articulated through 
human language, culture and understandings of the world. Like Fudge, we consider this is 
regrettable but inevitable, we might question our legacies and prejudices, but we cannot 
actually think otherwise. 
For the critically posthumanist perspective we advance, human lifeways have 
incredible impacts on all other species and living things – we already intervene massively in 
the non-human through agriculture, industry, fishing, building or mining. The question for 
those seeking posthuman emancipation is about the re-appraisal of current interventions on 
non-human worlds, and the development of more creaturely ways of being where we accept 
our place with other species and things and as far as we are able, act with compassion. 
Posthuman community understands our embedding in complex living systems as 
characterised by diversity and difference, while also being attuned to an agenda set by the 
radical politics of intersectionalised ecologism which resists the instrumentalisation, 
enslavement and destruction of non-human being. It is this kind of collective resistance which 
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we would emphasise as a means to securing a more creaturely politics. We do not need to go 
back to get to a posthuman future and can safely leave Zerzan alone in the woods. 
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